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Protecting the ‘rights of others’ in the UK: Religious expression, reasonable 
accommodation and the real meaning of non-discrimination  
 
 
 
Over the years, states have been developing and implementing legislation with the aim of 
protecting individuals against discrimination, inter alia, on the grounds of sexual orientation 
and gender identity. Recent developments have led to an expansion of the concept of ‘family’ 
to include same-sex couples and single parents and the progressive adjustment of the law 
with a view to extend parenthood rights to less ‘’traditional’ family forms. In terms of access 
to parenthood, objections of conscience may arise in relation to facilitating adoption by 
same-sex couples or single parent adoption, whereby religious objectors may feel that their 
professional duties are in direct conflict with the tenets of their religion. Conscientious 
objections have traditionally been expressed by persons whose beliefs are at odds with laws 
compelling them to carry out certain functions, such as facilitating adoptions in same-sex 
families or registering and officiating civil unions. The progressive legal recognition of 
alternative family unions and parenthood rights to non-traditional family forms on the one 
hand, and the manifestation of religious beliefs outside an individual’s forum internum1 on the 
other, can be described as an ‘explosive mix’ of conflicting rights and freedoms. In addition 
to national courts in the Council of Europe’s member states, the European Court of Human 
Rights has been exploring the scope and limits of the right of conscientious objection as a 
particular aspect of the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. In the 
European context, the European Court of Human Rights has demonstrated through its 
jurisprudence that although a ‘human right’ to conscientious objection exists, this is not 
absolute, but subject to permissible limitations as found in Article 9(2) ECHR2 including the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
 
 
                                                            
1 The term ‘forum internum’ is used to place objections of conscience within an internal and private sphere of 
the individual against which no State interference is justified. The term ‘forum externum’ is used to denote the 
external manifestation of a religion or a belief that is subject to certain permissible limitations. See P. M. 
Taylor, Freedom of Religion: UN and European Human Rights Law and Practice (Cambridge University Press, 
2005). 
2 In Bayatyan v Armenia [2011], the Court confirmed that a genuine conscientious objection to military service 
can sufficiently attract the protections of Article 9, whereas in Eweida v UK [2013] the failure to allow 
exemptions from officiating or registering civil partnerships and another for providing counselling to same-
sex couples were held by the European Court to pursue a legitimate aim to protect the rights and freedoms of 
others. 
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I     INTRODUCTION 
 
Objections to compulsions under the law 
 
Objections to compulsions under the law can be legally recognised and protected, to some 
extent, through legislation. Refusals to certain compulsions under the law may have either a 
religious or ideological background and include objections to the obligation to swear a 
religious oath3, military service4, abortion5 or the teaching of religion in schools.6 Other 
objections relating to the provision of healthcare7 include objections to medically-assisted 
reproduction,8 euthanasia in countries where such a procedure is permitted by law,9 refusal 
to withdraw or withhold life-sustaining treatment,10 compulsory vaccination,11 the 
provision of medically prescribed contraceptive products and/or emergency contraception,12 
the provision of fertility treatment,13 or even participation in Caesarean Delivery on 
Maternal Request.14  
 
Conscientious objections in the context of medical healthcare and bioethics in the United 
Kingdom are protected, albeit not entirely, by law and may be defined as objections to a 
particular medical procedure due to moral, ethical or religious motives. In the United 
                                                            
3 Buscarini and others v San Marino, App no 24645/94, Reports 1999-I. 
4 Bayatyan v Armenia, App no. 23459/03, judgment of 7 July 2011. 
5 Shaw D., Abortion and Human Rights, Clinical Obsterics and Gynaecology (2010), vol. 24(5), p 633 
6 Braithwaite discusses denominational religion in the public educational system in the United Kingdom – 
Anglican, Non-Conformist and Catholic – and proposes a conscience clause for parents to decide whether to 
allow their children to receive religious instruction at school. See Braithwaite C., Conscientious objection to 
various compulsions under British law (William Sessions, 1995). 
7 Wicclair M. R., Conscientious Objection in Health Care: An ethical analysis (Cambridge University Press, 2011), 
p. 31. 
8 See Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (as amended in 2008), section 38:  
“Conscientious objection: 
(1)No person who has a conscientious objection to participating in any activity governed by this Act shall be 
under any duty, however arising, to do so. 
(2)In any legal proceedings the burden of proof of conscientious objection shall rest on the person claiming to 
rely on it. 
(3)In any proceedings before a court in Scotland, a statement on oath by any person to the effect that he has a 
conscientious objection to participating in a particular activity governed by this Act shall be sufficient evidence 
of that fact for the purpose of discharging the burden of proof imposed by subsection (2) above.” 
9 Wicclair M.R., Conscientious Objection in Medicine, Bioethics [2000] Vol 14(3), p 205. 
10 BMA, Expressions of doctors’ beliefs, available at <http://bma.org.uk/practical-support-at-
work/ethics/expressions-of-doctors-beliefs> [accessed 11-7-15] 
11 Braithwaite, op cit 6 p167. 
12 Pichon and Sajous v France, App no 49853/99, judgment of 2 October 2001. 
13 Equality and Human Rights Commission, ‘Religion or belief, equality and human rights in England and 
Wales’, Research Report No 84, p 83, available at 
<http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/documents/research/rr84_final_opt.pdf> 
[accessed 2-7-15] 
14 Gail A. Van Norman, Clinical Ethics in Anesthesiology: A case-based textbook (Cambridge, 2011), p.52 
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Kingdom, practitioners who have a conscientious objection to abortion can rely on section 
4(2) of the British Abortion Act 1967, which, however, excludes refusal on grounds of 
conscience of ‘treatment which is necessary to save the life or to prevent grave permanent 
injury to the physical or mental health of a pregnant woman’. This right is therefore limited 
only to the active participation in an abortion where there is no emergency regarding the 
physical or mental health of a pregnant woman.15  
 
A refusal to engage in practices that are contrary to a person’s conscientious beliefs may 
arise with respect to several other medical procedures, including sterilisation, fertility 
treatment, pre-natal examinations and the prescription or dispensing of contraceptives as 
mentioned above. It may be argued that such objections are not, at least in principle, 
conflicting with equality legislation, if objections to perform certain duties are dismissed by 
the objector as a whole and not selectively. A serious conflict with equality legislation 
would arise if the medical practitioner expressed their objections to perform their functions, 
only against a particular social group. For example, as noted by Kennedy and Grubb, a 
problematic scenario arises when medical practitioners refuse artificial insemination to 
lesbian women based on their sexual orientation.16  
 
In the aforementioned example, the law would be interpreted in a way that gives precedence 
to equality legislation.17 For instance, interpreting section 38 of the Human Fertilisation 
and Embryology Act 1990 (as amended by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 
2008) in light of the Equality Act, such an objection would not fall within the scope of 
‘participating in any activity governed by this Act [the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act]’,18 since the objection is, in principle, to refuse treatment to a specific 
class of persons; it is not a conscientious objection to a medical procedure per se. It is 
suggested therefore, that although a conscientious objection to a medical procedure may be 
recognised under legislation, it may not be permitted if it is discriminatory or contrary to 
the equality and diversity policies of organisations and employers.  
 
                                                            
15 Doogan and another v Greater Glasgow and Clyde Health Board [2012] CSOH 32, 29 February 2012, opinion 
of Lady Smith, paras 75-80, available at <http://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/opinions/2012CSOH32.html> 
[accessed 20-6-15] 
16 Kennedy I. and Grubb A., Medical law (Butterworths Publishing, 2000), p 1282. 
17 Equality Act 2010, Ch 15. 
18 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, section 38(1) ‘No person who has a conscientious objection 
to participating in any activity governed by this Act shall be under any duty, however arising, to do so’. 
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It is therefore clear that each occurrence of a conscientious refusal to treat or serve others 
needs to be considered on its own facts, as competing interests between different parties 
may emerge. For example, in Pichon and Sajous v France, considered by the European Court 
of Human Rights in 2001, the owners of a pharmacy refused to sell contraceptives on a 
doctor’s prescription to three women on religious grounds; the women later lodged a 
complaint against the owners of the pharmacy to the local police, where the owners were 
found guilty for refusing to sell the contraceptives and later ordered to pay damages to the 
complainants. After exhausting all their appeal rights, the pharmacy owners lodged a 
complaint to the European Court of Human Rights, arguing that their right to freedom of 
religion under Article 9 of the Convention had been ignored by the domestic courts. The 
Strasbourg Court, in dismissing their application, ruled that the applicants could not ‘give 
precedence to their religious beliefs and impose them on others as justification for their 
refusal to sell such products, since they can manifest those beliefs in many ways outside the 
professional sphere’.19 
 
It consequently emerges that an important consideration in relation to the expression of 
conscientious objections in medical healthcare is the balance and limits of religious and 
other manifestations and how these affect the rights and freedom of others, including 
reproductive rights which constitute a crucial aspect of the right to private and family life.20  
 
II     THE IMPACT OF EWEIDA V UK ON CASES CONCERNING RELIGIOUS 
MANIFESTATIONS IN THE WORKPLACE  
 
The standard test for establishing a genuine conscientious objection requires that the 
objection must be linked to a conviction or belief of sufficient cogency, seriousness, cohesion 
and importance to attract the guarantees of Article 9 ECHR.21 Nevertheless, even if a 
genuine conscientious objection is recognised as being of sufficient cogency and importance, 
the refusal to accommodate such an objection does not necessarily give rise to a violation of 
Article 9 ECHR. The right to manifest a conscientious objection is subject to permissible 
limitations posed by Article 9(2) ECHR when measures taken to restrict an individual’s 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion are prescribed by law and are necessary in a 
                                                            
19 Pichon and Sajous v France (2001), op cit 12. 
20 Tysiac v Poland (2007), app no 5410/03, 45 EHRR 42. 
21 Bayatyan v Armenia [2011], op cit 4 para. 110.  
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democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health 
or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
 
In Ladele v London Borough of Islington [2009],22 the UK Court of Appeal found against the 
appellant, a former registrar that challenged her dismissal from employment that resulted 
from her non-involvement in the registration of civil partnerships for same sex couples. The 
appellant had refused to perform her duties towards same-sex couples on the basis of her 
religious beliefs.  
 
Ms Ladele claimed that, in failing to treat her differently from staff that did not have a 
conscientious objection to registering civil partnerships, the local authority had 
discriminated against her on the basis of her religion.23  She further argued that the local 
authority had discretion not to designate her as a registrar of civil partnerships but failed to 
exercise this discretion by accommodating her request to be exempted from her duties in 
relation to civil partnerships. The Court of Appeal concluded that there had been no 
unlawful religious discrimination by the local council against the appellant, despite the fact 
that the nature of her duties had been altered substantially since she was appointed as a 
registrar. 
 
Ms Ladele’s case was subsequently heard by the European Court of Human Rights in 
Eweida v UK in 2010, which considered four different claims from individuals who were 
dismissed from their employment because of their failure to comply with their employers’ 
equality and diversity policies24, insofar as those policies were at odds with their religious 
beliefs. In finding no violation of Ms Ladele’s Convention rights, the Strasbourg court held 
that ‘regard must be had in particular to the fair balance that has to be struck between the 
competing interests of the individual and of the community as a whole, subject in any event 
to the margin of appreciation enjoyed by the State’.25 The court reiterated the principle 
previously expressed in Shalk and Kopf v Austria, that ‘same-sex couples are in a relevantly 
                                                            
22 Ladele v London Borough of Islington [2009] EWCA Civ 1357 
23 On appeal, Ladele v London Borough of Islington [2008] UKEAT 045308 1912, judgment of 19 December 
2008, para 51 
24 For example, in Ms Ladele’s case, the London Borough of Islington was enforcing the “Dignity for All” 
Equality and Diversity policy, available at <http://www.islington.gov.uk/publicrecords/library/Community-
and-living/Information/Factsheets/2011-2012/(2012-03-03)-Dignity-For-All.pdf> [accessed 11-7-15]. In 
the case of another applicant, Mr McFarlane, his employer ‘Relate’ also had an Equal Opportunities Policy 
containing a positive duty to achieve equality; available at 
<http://www.relate.org.uk/files/relate/equal_opps_monitoring_and_health_declaration.doc> [accessed 11-
7-15]. 
25 Eweida v UK [2013] ECHR 37, para. 84 
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similar situation to different-sex couples as regards their need for legal recognition and 
protection of their relationship, although since practice in this regard is still evolving across 
Europe, the Contracting States enjoy a wide margin of appreciation as to the way in which 
this is achieved within the domestic legal order’.26 This wide margin of appreciation meant 
that the United Kingdom could exercise its discretion to use all means it deemed 
appropriate to enforce its domestic equality laws requiring civil registrars to perform their 
duties both in relation to the registration of marriages and civil partnerships. 
 
The principle on non-discrimination and its strong enforcement in domestic legislation 
played a crucial part in the outcome of this case. Employers often incorporate non-
discrimination principles in the form of equality and diversity policies to ensure compliance 
with the law. As the European Court noted referring to Ms Ladele, ‘the borough of 
Islington was not merely entitled, but obliged to require her to perform civil partnerships’.27 
The European Court placed emphasis on the obligatory, rather than the discretionary 
nature of performing duties prescribed by the employer. The case of Eweida v UK echoes the 
need for a careful balance between religious expressions and manifestations in the work 
place, and the need to enforce equality legislation by refusing to accommodating exemptions 
from professional duties when this would result to discrimination against others on any of 
the grounds protected under the Equality Act 2010, namely age, disability, gender 
reassignment, marriage and civil partnership, pregnancy and maternity, race, religion or 
belief, sex and sexual orientation.28 The Equality Act 2010 incorporated the Employment 
Equality Framework Directive 2000/78/EC which establishes, inter alia, a general 
framework for equal treatment in employment and an obligation to provide reasonable 
accommodation for people with disabilities.  
 
Although Eweida confirms that conscientious objections of sufficient cogency and 
seriousness are capable of attracting the protection of the European Convention on Human 
Rights under Article 9, the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights indicates 
that States are under no positive obligation to accommodate conscientious objections when 
these are conflicting with the overarching aims of equality legislation and employment 
policies. Furthermore, in light of Directive 2000/78/EC the meaning of ‘reasonable 
                                                            
26 Ibid, para 105 
27 Ibid, para 29 
28 Equality Act 2010, s 4.  
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accommodation’ should be taken so as to facilitate the access of disabled persons to 
employment and to eliminate disadvantages against them.  
 
The debate on accommodating religious beliefs has not led to any law or policy changes 
since Eweida v UK, whereas the decision has been reiterated in subsequent cases. Its 
implications are echoed in Lady Hale’s obiter dicta in Bull et al v Hall et al where she stated: 
 
‘I am more than ready to accept that the scope for reasonable 
accommodation is part of the proportionality assessment, at least in some 
cases. This is reinforced by the decision in Eweida v United Kingdom (2013) 
57 EHRR 8, where the Strasbourg court abandoned its previous stance that 
there was no interference with an employee's right to manifest her religion if 
it could be avoided by changing jobs. Rather, that possibility was to be taken 
into account in the overall proportionality assessment, which must therefore 
consider the extent to which it is reasonable to expect the employer to 
accommodate the employee's right’.29 
 
It therefore remains as the employer’s duty to accommodate their employees’ 
conscientious objection; nevertheless, Eweida is already being used in adjudication 
in light of the ECHR’s current approach in determining whether the employer’s 
restrictions constituted proportionate means of pursuing a legitimate aim and 
whether the right balance had been struck. Describing it as a “distraction” in 
finding a violation of Article 9 in Greater Glasgow Health Board v Doogan et al, a UK 
Supreme Court decision concerning the refusal of two Christian nurses to be 
involved in abortion procedures, Lady Hale stated that  
 
‘Refusing for religious reasons to perform some of the duties of a job is likely 
(following the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in  Eweida  
v United Kingdom ((2013) 57 EHRR 8) to be held to be a manifestation of a 
religious belief. There would remain difficult questions of whether the 
restrictions placed by the employers upon the exercise of that right were a 
proportionate means of pursuing a legitimate aim.’30 
 
                                                            
29 Bull and another v Hall and another [2013] UKSC 73, para 47.  
30 Greater Glasgow Health Board v Doogan and another (Scotland) [2014] UKSC 68. 
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Even though Lady Hale recognised that the reasonable accommodation of 
employee’s religious beliefs depended on practicalities that could be resolved at 
tribunal level,31 the decision of the Supreme Court in Doogan reiterates the 
significance of Eweida and its impact in the workplace. Eweida has further been 
applied more recently and at first instance in Lee v Ashers Baking Co Ltd32, otherwise 
known as the “gay cake” case where a Belfast court found Ashers to have breached 
equality and non-discrimination laws by refusing service to a client because of their 
sexual orientation. The case went on appeal but it failed.33 The court repeated that 
the bakers were not allowed to provide a service only to people who complied with 
their religious beliefs. This cements the courts’ position that businesses in Northern 
Ireland are not exempted from equality legislation. 
 
III      ATTEMPTS FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM TO ACCOMMODATE 
RELIGIOUS MANIFESTATIONS IN THE WORKPLACE  
 
As indicated by the following examples, the legislature in the United Kingdom has so far 
declined to demonstrate a willingness to accommodate the full spectrum of religious 
manifestations in the work place, and, in particular, refusals to solemnise or register civil 
partnerships, same-sex marriages or facilitate same-sex parent adoptions.  
 
In 2003, Baroness Blatch, during a debate on the Local Government Bill 2003, proposed a 
right to ‘opt-out’ for Christian social workers who refused to participate in adoptions by 
same-sex couples.34 Lady O’ Cathain went further to suggest an exception to participate in 
any placement under section 18 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 (concerning 
placement for adoption by agencies) where a person had a conscientious objection based on 
their religion or belief.35 Lady O’ Cathain, in a House of Lords debate on Equality Bill in 
                                                            
31 Ibid, para 24 (Lady Hale): ‘their employers should have made reasonable adjustments to the requirements of 
the job in order to cater for their religious beliefs. This will, to some extent at least, depend upon issues of 
practicability which are much better suited to resolution in the employment tribunal proceedings’. 
32 Lee v Ashers Baking Co Ltd [2015] NICty 2 (19 May 2015) 
33 www.courtsni.gov.uk  
34 Official Report of the Grand Committee on the Local Government Bill, HL Deb 23 June 2003 vol 650 cc1-
58GC, Para 39GC, available at 
<http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/grand_committee_report/2003/jun/23/official-report-of-the-grand-
committee> [accessed 11-7-2015] 
35 Local Government Bill, moved Amendment No. 13, 10 September 2003 available at 
<http://www.publicwhip.org.uk/division.php?date=2003-09-10&number=5&house=lords&display=allvotes> 
[accessed 11-7-2015] 
9 
 
2005 suggested a prohibition that would allow exemptions from officiating or participating 
civil partnerships under the Civil Partnership Act 2004, and from arranging or participating 
in the registration of marriage involving a person that have legally changed their gender 
under the Gender Recognition Act 2004.36 The government refused to implement the 
proposed amendment and it was subsequently withdrawn. 
 
Two further amendments to the Equality Bill (now the Equality Act 2010) were proposed 
to the House of Lords in 2010. The amendments, proposed by Baroness Butler-Sloss, 
constitute some of the first attempts to incorporate ‘reasonable accommodation’ clauses in 
relation to those refusing to provide services to LGBT individuals. In a controversial 
motion, Baroness Butler-Sloss proposed the insertion into the Equality Bill of a right not to 
be ‘complicit with an action or circumstance’ which would be contrary to the beliefs of 
employees.37 These amendments were also withdrawn. 
 
Supported by Baroness Cumberlege, Lord Mackay and Baroness Williams, Baroness Butler-
Sloss has proposed similar amendments to the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill that was 
later passed into law in 2013. The suggested amendment was the following:  
 
Page 2, line 7, at end insert— 
 
 (6)   Any duty of a person employed as a registrar of marriages on the date this Act 
comes into force (“relevant registrar”) to solemnise marriages is not extended by this 
Act to marriages of same sex couples if the relevant registrar has a conscientious 
objection to doing so. 
(7)   Nothing in subsection (6) shall affect the duty of a relevant registrar to 
carry out any other duties and responsibilities of his employment. 
(8)   The conscientious objection, under subsection (6), must be based on a sincerely 
held religious or other belief concerning only the marriage of same sex couples and in 
                                                            
36 House of Lords, Equality Bill [HL], Amendments to be moved in Committee, available at 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200506/ldbills/002/amend/su002-ia.htm> [accessed 11-7-
2015] 
37 House of Lords, Equality Bill, available at 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200910/ldbills/035/amend/ml035-ir.htm> [accessed 11-7-
2015]. Proposed text of clause 29: ‘A service-provider must make reasonable adjustments to ensure that, so far 
as is possible, no employee is required to be complicit with an action or circumstance to which the employee 
has a genuine conscientious objection on the basis of the employee's beliefs regarding sexual orientation.’ 
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any legal proceedings the burden of proof of conscientious objection shall rest on the 
person claiming to rely on it. 38 
 
These proposals had the same fate as all other attempts to incorporate conscientious 
objection clauses into domestic legislation. None of these proposed amendments have been 
introduced into the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013 that entered into force on 13 
March 2014.39 
 
IV     THE IMPACT OF EQUALITY LEGISLATION ON CATHOLIC ADOPTION 
AGENCIES 
 
In light of the legislature’s reluctance to incorporate conscientious objection clauses into 
legislation, a case that demonstrates the significance of equality legislation and the impact it 
had on Catholic adoption agencies with a charitable status is Catholic Care v The Charity 
Commission for England and Wales [2010].40 In this case, the High Court considered two 
Charity Tribunal decisions that prevented the appellant, a Roman Catholic charity offering 
adoption services from selecting its charitable objects by amending its memorandum of 
association in order to prohibit adoption by same-sex couples. According to the High Court, 
this amounted to discrimination and did not fall within the exemption of Regulation 18 of 
the Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2007.41 Explaining the purpose of 
Regulation 18, Justice Briggs stated, inter alia, that: 
 
it was no part of the purpose of Regulation 18 to give carte blanche to publicly 
funded faith-based adoption agencies to continue to deny their services to same-
sex couples, simply by changing their charitable instruments during the 
transitional period.42 
 
                                                            
38 Marriage (Same-Sex Couples) Bill, Session 2013-14, available at 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/lbill/2013-2014/0034/amend/ml034-ir.htm> [accessed 
11-7-2015] 
39 Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013, ch 30, available at 
<http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2013/30/pdfs/ukpga_20130030_en.pdf> [accessed 20-6-15]  
40 Catholic Care v The Charity Commission for England and Wales [2010] EWHC 520 (Ch), available at 
<http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2010/520.html> [accessed 20-6-15]  
41 Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2007, SI 2007/1263. Regulation 18: ‘Nothing in the 
Regulations will make it unlawful for a person to provide benefits only to persons of a particular sexual 
orientation, if (a) he acts in pursuance of a charitable instrument, and (b) the restriction of benefits to persons 
of that sexual orientation is imposed by reason of or on the grounds of the provisions of the charitable 
instrument.’ 
42 Catholic Care v The Charity Commission for England and Wales [2010], op cit 40 para 84. 
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In interpreting the meaning of Regulation 18, the Court concluded that,  
 
it is by implication limited to the provision of benefits on the basis of differential 
treatment which would be justified under Article 14, and in most cases 
(including the present) but not necessarily all, the regulatory powers of the 
Charity Commission would be sufficient to ensure that Regulation 18 conferred 
no exemption in relation to unjustified discrimination.43 
 
In Catholic Care v The Charity Commission for England and Wales, the High Court ruled in 
unequivocal terms that charities will not be pardoned or given unrestricted power to act at 
their own discretion by relying on exemption clauses if they cannot demonstrate that their 
policies are proportionate to achieve a legitimate aim, or for the purpose of preventing or 
compensating for a disadvantage linked to a protected characteristic. The same rationale 
could apply to section 193 of the Equality Act 2010 which provides for a charitable 
instrument exemption to provide benefits to beneficiaries sharing a protected characteristic. 
Allowing charities to provide the benefit of parenthood to heterosexual couples and openly 
discriminating against another group, would not only mean that exemptions are misapplied, 
but it would also result in a breach of Convention rights, such as Article 8 ECHR which 
protects the right to private and family life, and Article 14 ECHR which prohibits 
discrimination.   
 
It is argued that since registrars are carrying out public duties, it is plausible to distinguish 
between objections of conscience and allow the existence of reasonable limitations to the 
exercise of religious manifestations in the workplace. Kenneth Norrie, for example, has 
argued that objections by health care professionals relating to abortion or other 
compulsions under the law is rather different since healthcare professionals are not carrying 
out public functions in the same way as public servants and there is therefore more leeway 
to accommodate religious manifestations for healthcare professionals if their actions do not 
constitute systemic discrimination. In England, a number of Catholic adoption agencies 
with charitable status faced closure since the Charity Commission found that policies of 
excluding non-traditional families are in breach of the Equality Act 2010 on the basis of 
discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation.44 Catholic Care, a Roman Catholic 
                                                            
43 Ibid, para 104 
44 BBC News, Catholic charity's appeal over gay adoption fails, available at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-
11019895> accessed on 26-1-17; Martin Beckford, ‘Last Catholic adoption agency faces closure after Charity 
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charity lost an appeal in 2012 when it failed to demonstrate that it held compelling reasons 
justifying a change to its memorandum of association in order to exempt itself from the 
Equality Act 2010 and restrict adoption services to same-sex couples.45  
 
 
V  ‘REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION’ AS A MEANS OF LEGITIMISING 
DISCRIMINATION 
 
This paper adopts the definition of “reasonable accommodation” as this is found in the UN 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and in Article 5 of EU Directive 
2000/78. According to the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 
‘reasonable accommodation’ means ‘necessary and appropriate modification and adjustments 
not imposing a disproportionate or undue burden, where needed in a particular case, to 
ensure to persons with disabilities the enjoyment or exercise on an equal basis with others 
of all human rights and fundamental freedoms’. In the same light, according to Article 5 of 
Directive 2000/78,  
 
in order to guarantee compliance with the principle of equal treatment in relation to 
persons with disabilities, reasonable accommodation shall be provided. This means that 
employers shall take appropriate measures, where needed in a particular case, to enable 
a person with a disability to have access to, participate in, or advance in employment, or 
to undergo training, unless such measures would impose a disproportionate burden on 
the employer. This burden shall not be disproportionate when it is sufficiently remedied 
by measures existing within the framework of the disability policy of the Member State 
concerned. 
 
It is therefore clear that the notion of ‘reasonable accommodation’ was developed to give 
effect to the protection of disadvantaged minorities, and in light of the Directive, the 
provision of ‘reasonable accommodation’ is specific to the rights of disabled persons. One of 
the most recent attempts to modify the meaning of ‘reasonable accommodation’ and expand 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
Commission ruling’ (The Telegraph), 19 August 2010, available at 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/religion/7952526/Last-Catholic-adoption-agency-faces-closure-after-
Charity-Commission-ruling.html> [accessed 18-7-15] 
45 Catholic Care (Diocese of Leeds) v Charity Commission for England and Wales, appeal to the Upper Tribunal 
(Tax and Chancery) on appeal from the First-Tier Tribunal (General Regulatory Chamber) (Charity), ref no 
CA/2010/0007, available at <https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/judgments/catholic-care-charity-commission-
judgment-02112012/> [accessed 26-1-17] 
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it to incorporate an exemption for employees exercising public functions was made by Lord 
Anderson of Swansea at the House of Lords during the Committee stage of the Marriage 
(Same Sex Couples) Bill. Lord Anderson proposed the insertion of clause permitting 
‘reasonable accommodation’ for employers who express conscientious objections to 
performing their duties in a same-sex marriage: 
 
 Reasonable accommodation 
 
(1)   An employer has a duty to take such steps as are reasonably practical 
to accommodate an employee who has a conscientious belief that marriage is the union 
of one man to one woman for life to the exclusion of all others. 
(2)   The duty in subsection (1) applies where an employee would otherwise 
be required to act in a way which is contrary to their conscientious belief 
about marriage. 
(3)   For the purposes of subsection (1), an employee is as defined in section 
230 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 but does not include a registrar, 
a superintendent registrar, the Registrar General or any person holding or exercising 
judicial office. 
(4)   This section is without prejudice to any rights which an employer 
has under Schedule 9 to the Equality Act 2010.46 
 
This proposed insertion was not included to the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013. 
 
In light of the arguments outlined above, reasonable accommodation in the workplace needs 
to be carefully balanced and adjusted to legally protected principles of equal treatment, since 
near-blanket recognition and accommodation of all religious manifestations without taking 
into account equality legislation could in certain cases amount to legitimising 
discrimination. Given the wide scope of “beliefs” falling within the right to freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion, accommodating manifestations that are directly 
discriminatory could potentially open the floodgates of litigation for other religious or non-
religious objectors seeking the right to be exempted from their professional duties on the 
basis of their religious, moral or philosophical beliefs.   
                                                            
46 Lords Hansard, Amendment 53, moved by Lord Anderson of Swansea, available at 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201314/ldhansrd/text/130708-0003.htm> [accessed 20-6-
15] 
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VI       CONCLUSION 
 
Religious manifestations in the workplace have drawn considerable attention and debate 
over the years, particularly with the change of social perceptions and the gradual 
recognition of the rights of minorities. In cases of conscientious objections to medical 
procedures for children where the decision of the parents may have serious impact on the 
life on a child, it is acceptable for a court to give weight to the rights of the child over the 
right of their parents. For example, in cases where blood transfusion to a child is refused by 
the parents, a court may place the child in the care of a local council, or issue a court order 
in this regard, in order to allow the transfusion to preserve life. Therefore, domestic policies 
that may restrict religious manifestations, although they may seem punitive by the objector, 
can, in certain circumstances, be justified. As the recent jurisprudence on religious 
manifestation suggests, the nature of particular posts may become determinant factors in 
decisions involving conflict of rights in the field of employment. Public servants, Catholic 
adoption agencies and health care providers have so far been unsuccessful in their efforts to 
secure exemptions from their duties on the basis of their religious beliefs. Recent decisions 
such as those in Bull v Hull and Lee v Ashers Baking Co Ltd indicate that private businesses 
are also likely to be bound by equality legislation and its prevailing safeguards. 
 
Balancing religious rights with the rights and freedoms of others has been proven a 
particularly challenging task for the legislature and the judiciary in the United Kingdom. 
The decisions and arguments outlined in this paper constitute evidence of the importance of 
safeguarding the right to equality and non-discrimination in the workplace. This view was 
highlighted by the Employment Appeal Tribunal in Ladele where it was held that the issue 
was not a matter of giving equal respect to the rights of the claimant and the rights of the 
LGBT community, but it was whether the means adopted by the local council to achieve 
this aim were proportionate and necessary in a democratic society. As indicated by the 
jurisprudence of domestic and international courts, the right of conscientious objection 
exists and is recognised where necessary; however it is not absolute. Any attempts to 
reasonably accommodate religious manifestations must, first and foremost, be balanced with 
the rights of others and must take into account the fundamental protections of non-
discrimination and equality legislation. 
